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ABSTRACT: THE CASE FOR HEAVIER CAPITAL GAINS TAXATION
Unless tax policy is evaluated not only from a short-run macroeconomic
fiscal policy standpoint but also from a longer-run microeconomic policy
standpoint that considers taxation's effects upon equity and resource allocation
efficiency, federal taxation's unnecessary excess burden will become no lighter
and may grow heavier. This paper attempts to redress the balance of the current
federal personal and corporate income tax reform discussion, which has paid
minimal attention to the case for heavier capital gains taxation. It reviews
the capital gains tax policy literature, argues that present tax law's special
treatment of capital gains and losses (compared with its treatment of ordinary
income and loss) is not justified, and offers specific recommendations for
taxing capital gains more heavily.
Special treatment is horizontally and vertically inequitable. It is a
major cause of income tax law complexity. And it misallocates the resources
invested in new physical capital, by distorting taxpayers' financial decisions
and disrupting movements of financial capital, more seriously than heavier
capital gains taxation would. Capital gains tax reform should decrease the
differential between the effective tax rates on capital gains and ordinary
income, and narrow the legal definition of capital assets qualifying for
special treatment.
This paper was presented to the Forty-Fourth Annual Meeting of the
Western Economic Association, "Tax Reform and Voting" concurrent session
VII at 10:30 a.m. Thursday 21 August 1969, and is abstracted in the Western
Economic Journal
,
VII No. 4 (September 1969). It does not reflect trie views
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preceding draft. He is additionally indebted to his wife, to Harold
F. McClelland and W. Bayard Taylor of Claremont Men's College
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When inflation threatens, most economic discussion about taxation
debates the necessity of a tax increase. Are inflationary pressures really
significant? Has monetary policy been used as much as deemed advisable
to raise interest rates and discourage private spending? Has government
spending been cut as much as feasible given war, or social needs or
pressures? How soon will any particular anti-inflationary action actually
affect aggregate demand — will it take effect only after increased real
output of goods and services has matched the initially unsatisfiable
demand, the inflationary problem has eased or ended, and the economy is
in danger of a recession?
Conversely, in recession most tax discussions concern analogous
questions about the need for a tax cut. In either case, such uncertainties
may prevent discussion of a crucial question: which taxes should be
changed, and how? Yet the question "Which tax changes? " is far from
trivial. At least four implications demand consideration: Which tax
changes would Congress most likely adopt in time to do the joo required?
Which would deal most effectively with the immediate short-run problem
of inflation or recession? Which would be most desirable for the
economy's longer-run efficiency? Which would be most equitable?
Prompt congressional action is so imperative that the first question
may appear all-important; answers to the others, while interesting,
may not seem important enough to affect significantly the tax requests to
be made of Congress. But as important as speed of enactment is, the
relevance of a short-run tax policy's short-run effectiveness against the
problem at hand — the size and speed of its impact — should be obvious
also.
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And a short-run tax policy's longer-run consequences for equity
and economic efficiency are at least equally important.
In the lengthy pre-enactment discussion of the 1964 tax cut, the
notion that "tax reform" proposals should be divorced from tax proposals
designed to fight inflation (or recession) was advanced frequently. And
the belief that mixing "tax reform" and fiscal policy only delays
enactment of the fiscal policy is probably a major reason for former
President Johnson's choosing to fight inflation with an across-the-board
ten percent income tax surtax rather than with a set of specific changes
in particular personal and corporate income tax provisions and rates, and
for President Nixon's desire to separate surtax extension legislation from
tax reform legislation. But separation of fiscal policy from "tax reform"
proposals may prevent any improvement in and might even steadily
Consider the March 1966 increase in automobile, telephone, and
teletypewriter excises, to fight an inflation largely concentrated in heavy
investment goods, food, and medical and other consumer services. The
telephone and teletypewriter tax increases appear particularly poor choices,
since these services are produced by a regulated public utility industry,
probably under decreasing average unit cost conditions. The increased tax
on telephone calls presumably decreased demand below what it otherwise
would have been, increased the average cost of each telephone call made
(by spreading the high fixed overhead cost over fewer calls), and released
virtually no resources for use elsewhere in the economy. That these tax
changes were microeconomically inefficient seems clear. But should an
optimal tax policy strive for microeconomic neutrality, or should it be
designed to reduce demand for specific commodities where inflationary
pressures are most severe?
worsen the tax structure's effects upon both equity and the economy's
allocative efficiency. Desirable tax changes not required oy short-run
fiscal policy considerations will seldom be considered seriously. And if
short-run macroeconomic problems are met by tax changes designed without
regard for their long-run microeconomic impact, the unnecessary Durden of
federal taxation will oecome no lighter, and may grow heavier as various
stages in succeeding uusiness cycles pass into history.
Fiscal policy aside, there is an enormous need for federal income
tax reform designed to improve horizontal and vertical equity, to simplify
the tax law and the government's task of tax administration and the
taxpayer's task of tax compliance, and to remove tax distortions of the
private economy's allocation of resources. Tax changes for any purpose
should generally be designed to broaden the tax base and reduce tax rates,
oy eliminating and simplifying special exclusions, exemptions, and
deductions. Yet effective political pressure for more equitable,
microeconomically neutral, and uncomplicated taxation simply does not
exist, at least as compared with the aggregate pressures for special tax
See Pechman, Federal Tax Policy (1966); Goode, The Individual Income
Tax (1964); Stern, The Great Treasury Raid (1964); Eisenstein, Ideologies of
Taxa tion (1961); and Okner, Income Distribution and the Federal Income Tax
(1966). For a more neutral discussion, see U. S. Congress, Joint Economic
Committee, The Federal Revenue System: Facts and Proplems 1964 . For a
discussion of proposed Canadian tax reforms applied to the United States,
see Holland (editor), "A Symposium on the Report of the Royal Commission
on Taxation (Canada, 1966) -- The Carter Commission" (1969).
privilege. Consider the numerous compromises in the Kennedy Administra-
tion's 1962 tax reform proposals between the equity, microeconomic
neutrality, and tax law simplicity advantages of a broad income tax base
and the political advantages of catering to special taxpayer interests.
Consider the vigor with which the 88th Congress ignored or decimated the
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mildest of those compromise tax reform proposals. Finally, consider the
timidity of the reform proposals which currently have some chance of
passage, such as the suggestion to levy a minimum income tax on persons
receiving large amounts of untaxed or lightly taxed income, instead of
eliminating or even revising the tax law provisions which give rise to such
income.
Such considerations, which have resulted in the existing chaotic
tax structure, show that the need to identify the tax structure's most
disadvantageous deformities, to design appropriate changes for possible
inclusion in future tax bills, and to advocate with sufficient vigor the most
pressing of these changes, remains unsatisfied.
Perhaps the most important structural defect in the federal income
tax is its special favorable treatment for long term capital gains, in
U. S. President, 1961-1963 (Kennedy), President's 1963 Tax
Message .
2
U. S. Congress, House Committee on Ways and Means, Legislative
History of H. R. 8363, 88th Congress, The Revenue Act of 1964, Public Law
88-272 (1966). Also see Pechman, "Individual Income Tax Provisions of the
Revenue Act of 1964" (1965).
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comparison with its treatment of ordinary income. Long term gains,
primarily stock market and real estate profits (on assets held more than
six months) are taxed by including only one-half the gain in ordinary
income. Moreover, the effective tax rate on the included half of the
long term gain may not exceed 50 percent -- that is, 25 percent of the
entire gain. Short term gains, gains on assets held less than six months,
are considered "speculative profits" and are fully included in and taxed
as ordinary income.
The most recent comprehensive discussion of capital gains taxation
is David, Alternative Approaches to Capital Gain Taxation (1968). Also see
Folsom, The Full Inclusion of Capital Gains and Losses in the Taxable Income
of Individuals (1964); Seltzer, The Nature and Tax Treatment of Capital Gains and
Losses (1951); and U. S. Treasury Department, Tax Advisory Staff of the
Treasury, Federal Income Tax Treatment of Capital Gains and Losses (1951).
For a discussion of proposals to tax capital gains as ordinary income in
Canada, see Break, "Integration of Corporate and Personal Income Taxes"
(1969); Slitor, "The Carter Proposals on Capital Gains: Economic Effects
and Policy Implications for the United States" (1969); and Harberger, "In
Defense of Carter: A Personal Overview" (1969), pp. 167-169.
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Long term losses are subtracted from long term gains, short term
losses from short term gains, to get net long and net short term gains. If
there is a net long term loss it is subtracted from the net short term gain;
if there is a net short term loss, it is subtracted from the net long term
gain. Up to $1,000 of any overall capital loss is deducted from ordinary
income; any undeductible excess is carried forward to future tax years. A
corporation's long term gains are taxed either at the bottom bracket ordinary
income tax rate of 22 percent, or else at 25 percent; its short term gains are
taxed as ordinary income. Its capital losses are treated the same as an
individual's, except that they can never be deducted from ordinary income.
The precise definition of capital gain and loss is a major issue of a later
lection of this paper.
In addition, gains unrealized at the taxpayer's death never are taxed
at all. The heir who sells the property uses the value at the decedent's
death for his "cost" in computing his gain or loss. Thus all gain
accrued by the decedent escapes taxation.
This paper contends simply that the differential between present tax
law's especially favorable treatment of capital gains and its treatment of
ordinary income — effective tax rates on gains are generally less than
half the rates on ordinary income --is far too great. In any future tax
increases, capital gains taxes should go up more, proportionately,than any
increase in levies on ordinary income. In any future tax cuts, capital
gains taxes should not participate. Eventually, the distinction between
capital gains and ordinary income should disappear.
Special favorable tax treatment of capital gains (and losses) is
subject to criticism on three counts. First, such treatment disrupts the
horizontal equity and vertical progressivity of the income tax. Second,
it is the major contributor to the chaotic complexity of federal income tax
law. Third, it misallocates the resources invested in new physical capital,
by distorting taxpayers' financial decisions and disrupting movements of
financial capital, more seriously than heavier capital gains taxation would.
10
EQUITY CONSIDERATIONS
Society's struggle for an equitable tax structure is unending. Even if
government were removed from political pressures and were inclined to be
objectively dispassionate, its search for fairness in taxation would founder,
first upon its inability to make meaningful interpersonal utility comparisons,
and then upon the lack of any obvious rationale for assigning utility
reductions among taxpayers. Given the inevitable difficulty that decreasing
one man's tax burden requires increasing someone else's, the lack of
consensus about the operational meaning of equity is hardly surprising.
Hence we dispute whether the best index of taxable welfare is wealth,
consumption, or income; the degree (if any) to which levies upon any of
these bases should be progressive; and the allowances due for special
considerations such as family size and medical expenses. Such practical
questions need debating. But our use of an income tax, for example, need
not and should not involve quasi-metaphysical definitions of the word
"income." We are at liberty to define "income for tax purposes"
pragmatically, in order to obtain an index of relative economic welfare
among taxpayers such that the relative distribution among citizens of the
burdens from their collective use of scarce economic resources is as
reasonable as feasible.
What constitutes a reasonable relative distribution of tax burdens is
a value judgment, of course, and debatable. Nevertheless, much
See Blum and Kalven, The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation
(1953, 1963).
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discussion of the equity of capital gains tax policy studiously avoids this
issue. The standard argument against heavier gains taxation is that it
would be inequitable because "capital gains" are not "income/
1 But whether
or not capital gains really are income is irrelevant to the equity of capital
gains tax policy — irrelevant even though capital gains are taxed under
an "income" tax. The equity of taxing capital gains — under an income
tax or other levy — depends solely upon whether doing so "improves" or
1
"worsens" the distribution of relative tax burdens. Using this criterion,
consider the equity of the arguments commonly given in support of special
treatment for capital gains.
Equity Versus Gains Taxation
A taxpayer can benefit from owning a productive asset either by
holding it and receiving the stream of receipts it produces, or by selling
it to receive the capitalized value of its expected future stream of receipts.
A change in this capitalized value (excluding expected depreciation) is a
capital gain or loss. Aside from changes in the interest rate at which the
expected stream of receipts is capitalized, or changes in the price level,
a capital gain or loss will occur only if the asset becomes more or less
productive (in comparison with other assets) so that its expected future
stream of receipts increases or decreases (relative to other assets). Thus
"pure" capital gains and losses are a manifestation of changes in income.
Capital gains as income. The argument that even though capital gains
Turvey, "Equity and a Capital Gains Tax" (1960).
12
result from changes in expected future income/ they do not constitute
income/ and therefore are not properly subject to taxation at ordinary income
tax rates, traditionally is illustrated with an orchard.
Capital and income are regarded by most investors as quite distinct,
and fluctuations in the value of one's capital are unrelated to one's
income. . . . The crop of apples is clearly income , but the growth
in the size of the tree is not; it cannot be eaten or sold, except as
firewood. ... If a grown apple orchard is disposed of and the
proceeds reinvested in a pear orchard of equal value, there would
still seem to be no final realization in the form of income. Capital,
including the appreciation on it, has been changed from one form to
another, but it has at all times remained as capital distinct from
income.
In other words, taxing a capital gain (either when it occurs or when the
asset is sold) as well as the increased income which that gain represents,
2
is double taxation.
This double taxation argument, carried to its logical conclusion,
would exempt all saving from taxation — making consumption, rather than
total income (consumption and saving) , the taxable index of relative
taxpayer welfare. Taxing a capital gain as well as taxing the flow of
earnings that gain represents is no less equitable than taxing a salary
which is saved and invested and then taxing that investment's earnings
as well.
An income levy on consumption and saving is justified!, on the
assumption that a taxpayer able to save has more taxpaying ability than
^mith, Federal Tax Reform (1961), p. 122.
o
Wallich, "Taxation of Capital Gains in the Light of Recent Economic
Developments" (June 1965), pp. 139-140.
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another taxpayer spending an equal amount on consumption but unable to
save, and that the former's greater taxpaying ability is inadequately
measured by the future income earned by his invested savings. That is,
adequacy requires levying on the original saving.
The individual income tax applies to the entire income of an individual
whether it is spent or saved. Some have argued that the income tax is
unfair to those who save because it applies both to the income which
gives rise to the saving and to the income produced by the saving
process. But almost all economists now agree that, on equity grounds,
this double taxation argument does not have much merit. At any particular point
in time, an individual has the option to make a new decision to spend
or save from the income that is left to him after tax. If he decides to
save the income, he does not necessarily incur a new tax. It is only
if the saving is actually invested in an income producing asset that new
income is generated and this new income is, of course, subject to
additional tax.
If taxable income is to be an index of relative economic welfare amcng
taxpayers, defining it to include capital gains (and to deduct capital losses)
simply implies that the farmer whose orchard trees grow and mature has more
taxpaying ability than the farmer whose trees are stunted by a cold snap,
that the latter has more taxpaying ability than a third farmer whose trees
are blown down by a hurricane, and that their relative taxpaying abilities
are inadequately measured by the differences in the current income earned
by their respective properties. If this implication is unreasonable,
it is no more unreasonable than taxing a crop saved and invested to set out
a new orchard, as well as taxing the new orchard's crop.
Pechman, Federal Tax Policy. dp. 61-62. Also see Musgrave, The Theory




Rather than baldly asserting that capital gains are not income, recent
defenses of special favorable tax treatment of capital gains have argued
that capital gains are not income equitably subject to ordinary income
taxation because present national income accounting concepts exclude
them, or else because they are usually "illusory" — caused by changes in
the capitalization rate (interest rate) used to discount expected streams of
future income, or by inflation.
National income accounting concepts . The argument that capital gains
are not income and should not be subject to ordinary income taxation because
they are not included in "national income" has been advanced by Henry C.
Wallich. But if "taxable income" is to indicate relative ability to pay
taxes, national income accounting concepts are utterly irrelevant.
There is no reason to assume that the concept of income best suited to
the goals of national income accounting is the same as that best suited
to the oojectives of the income tax. . . . The issues can only be
confused by relying on a concept developed for one endeavor as a reasqn
for modifying another concept developed for a wholly different purpose.
The national income accounts are designed primarily to measure the
aggregate U. S. income from current production of goods and services.
Thus the "national income" is defined arbitrarily to exclude inventory
profits, transfer payments (including interest on government debt)
,
gifts
and bequests, and both short and long term capital gains, among other items.
Wallich, "Taxation of Capital Gains," pp. 136-137.
2
Blum,"Taxation of Capital Gains in the Light of Recent Economic
Developments -- some Observations "(December 1965), pp. 431, 432.
-Also see Musgrave, Public Finance , p. 169.
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At least some of these are reasonable inclusions in a "taxable income"
index of relative taxpaying capacity. The issue is not whether the sum of
microeconomic incomes equals macroeconomic income, as Wallich argues.
The issue is relative tax burdens.
2
Capitalization rate changes . Assuming that an asset's expected
future stream of earnings remains constant, the asset's capital value and
the rate of return it earns vary inversely. Thus as bond prices rise, bond
yields fall; as equity (stock) prices rise, the earnings/price ratio falls
(or, more popularly, the price/earnings ratio rises).
The argument that capital gains caused by a decline in the (interest)
rate at which future income is capitalized are "illusory/' not income
properly subject to income taxation, maintains that since the interest rate
decline does not change the taxpayer's earnings from his property, he is
no better off and should not be taxed. Similarly, if interest rates rise so
that the capitalized value of the asset falls, the taxpayer's ca tal loss
should not be deductible because he is no worse off. This arg ient really
is a more sophisticated version of the "changes in the value of capital are
not income" argument. Both assume that income tax paying ability arises
Wallich, "Rejoinder [to Blum] " (December 1965), p. 437. Here
Wallich does note the national income accounts' inventory profit adjustment.
It, however, unlike the capital gain exclusion from national income, is "not
important/' using some not specified criterion. Incidentally, for a view
(with supporting bibliography) that macroeconomic "national income" and
also "national output" should include capital gains, see Campbell, Capital
Gains, Economic Growth, and the Distribution of Income, 1897-195 6 (1964),
pp. 22-28, 55-61, 67-73, 236-327.
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For a more extended discussion of capital gains and losses due to
interest rate changes, see Seltzer, pp. 93-98; David , Alternative Approaches ,
pp. 55-56.
only after the taxpayer has maintained a sufficient capital value to provide
a constant absolute stream of money income from that capital.
Musgrave asserts that "the proposition that capital gains which
reflect a decline in the rate of interest should not be . . . taxable ... is
correct if income is defined as potential earning power, but it is not correct
if income is defined as potential spending power for consumption." He
implies that the earning power definition is appropriate "if saving is for
purposes of continuous accumulation," while the spending power definition
2
is appropriate "if saving is for purposes of potential consumption." In the
absence of information about savers' motivations, apparently either definition
can be justified. A taxable income index of relative taxpayer welfare defined
to be (changes in) potential consumption spending power seems more
intuitively appealing, perhaps because the economists' utility theory of
consumer choice usually assumes that saving is for the purpose of future
consumption rather than for its own sake.
Taxing capital gains caused by interest rate decreases may be
justified by considering relative taxpayer burdens in a world with fixed
price assets. If interest rates fall, the holder of a negotiable asset which
continues to produce the same income and has a higher market value is
better off in terms of earning power than the man whose fixed price asset
(such as a savings account) now yields fewer dollars per year. Moreover,






the negotiable asset holder's greater relative taxpaying capacity is
inadequately measured by his larger annual income, considering the
increase in his consumption spending potential.
Inflation . The argument that capital gains which reflect inflation
should not be taxed because they are not income properly subject to income
taxation supposes that relative taxpaying capacity arises only after the
taxpayer has maintained a capital-value sufficient to provide a constant
real income stream from that capital. But this condition is no more
reasonable than its money income analogue. Grant that capital gains
which reflect inflation are not "true" income — this admission in no way
indicates that such gains should be excluded from taxable income, even in
principle. During inflationary periods, inflating assets generate more
taxpaying ability than do non-inflating assets; a homeowner very well
may be better off than his neighbor whose rent increases. Whether or not
Although Wallich argues that gains due to interest rate changes are
"illusory" and not "true" income, he states that "in terms of equity, it is
hard to argue that there is no increase in taxpaying capacity" from such
gains; therefore he would tax them. ("Taxation of Capital Gains," pp. 13 7-
139.) Yet if an asset's (expected) future income stream increases, he
would exempt the resulting "pure" capital gain, measuring its recipient's
increased taxpaying capacity only by the amount of the increased income.
For Wallich, taxing a gain which capitalizes an (expected) larger income
stream is inequitable since doing so involves double taxation: the larger
future income will be taxed when it occurs (Ibid .
, pp. 139-140). If interest
rates change, Wallich would measure relative taxpaying capacities by
comparing income streams plus the capital gains (or minus the capital losses)
which occur; if actual income streams change, he would measure relative
taxpaying capacities by comparing income streams only, ignoring capital
gains and losses. The logic of this viewpoint is not clear. If the double
taxation argument applies, it ought to apply to both types of gain. See
Turvey, pp. 183-184.
18
inflationary gains should be taxed must turn on taxation's impact in
redressing the effects of inflation upon the distribution of real income.
To review the effects of inflation on the distribution of income,
consider four individuals: a debtor who has borrowed $10,000 and spent it
on consumption, an individual who has neither Dorrowed nor loaned, an
owner with $10,000 worth of property, and a creditor who has loaned
$10, 000. 2
Aside from the effects of interest rate movements inflation, of course,
improves the position of the debtor and worsens the position of the creditor
in terms of the real purchasing power of their asset positions. Also,
assuming that wages rise as rapidly as consumer prices, inflation should
have a neutral effect upon the position of the individual who has neither
oorrowed nor loaned. Similarly, assuming that property values rise as
rapidly as other prices, inflation should have a neutral effect upon the
position of the property owner. Both the individual who has neither borrowed
nor loaned, and the property owner, will have the same purchasing power as
before
.
Whether the homeowner's position in fact improves relative to the
renter's position depends upon their asset positions, as discussed below.

















If taxable income including all capital gains and deducting all capital
losses were measured consistently in real (deflated) terms, it would most
correctly assess inflation's redistribution of real income: it would levy on
the debtor's gains, it would ignore the individual who has neither borrowed
nor loaned and the property owner, and it would reduce the creditor's tax
burden.
However, complete and consistent measurement of all components of
taxable income in real (deflated) terms is apparently impractical, because
taxpayers in addition to reporting their income flows would have to report
the details of their asset and liability positions. Unfortunately, measuring
taxable income in money terms ignores the improvement in the debtor's
position relative to the creditor, and also ignores the (smaller) improvement
in the debtor's position relative to the individual who has neither borrowed
nor loaned and to the property owner.
Any argument that the measurement of taxable income primarily in
terms of money rather than real income should be relaxed by excluding
Musgrave suggests that deflation "by the prices of capital goods" is
appropriate "if saving is for purposes of continuous accumulation/ 1 while
deflation "by the prices of consumer goods" is appropriate "if saving is for
purposes of potential consumption." Musgrave, Public Finance
,
p. 169.
A third alternative would be to deflate by an overall price index including
both capital and consumer goods, such as the Gross National Product
implicit price deflator.
2
Of course, at tax rates below 100 percent, taxation can only partially
redress the redistributions of real income due to price level changes; taxing
inflationary gains (and deducting inflationary losses) does not fully compen-
sate inflation's losers. With regard to inflation, an ounce of prevention may
be more feasible than a pound of compensation.
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capital gains due to inflation from taxable income, implicitly compares the
property owner either with the debtor or with the individual who has neither
oorrowed nor loaned. Aside from taxation, inflation (by favoring the debtor
and having a neutral effect upon the property owner and upon the individual
who has neither borrowed nor loaned) worsens the position of the property
owner relative to the debtor, while leaving the property owner and the
individual who has neither borrowed nor loaned in the same relative position.
Taxing the property owner's inflationary gains will hurt him even more,
relative to the debtor, and also will hurt his otherwise unchanged position
relative to the individual who has neither borrowed nor loaned. Therefore,
2
according to this argument, inflationary gains should be tax exempt.
The difficulty with this whole argument is that it overlooks comparing
the property owner with the creditor. Aside from taxation, inflation (by
having a neutral effect upon the property owner while harming the creditor)
improves the property owner's position relative to the creditor. Hence the
The property owner's worsened relative position can not be justified
as a progressive redistribution of income from the rich to the poor, because
the property owner's income (say, $1,000 per year) may be substantially less
than the non-property income (say, $3 0, 000 per year) of the debtor or of the
individual who has neither borrowed nor loaned. For example, compare an
elderly retiree living off of a small investment in real property with an
entertainment star.
2
Wallich, "Taxation of Capital Gains," p. 137. Also see Seltzer,
p. 287. For an argument that correcting capital gains and losses for ordinary
price level increases is feasible and practical, see Cloe, "Capital Gains
and the Changing Price Level" (1952).
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property owner's inflationary gains should be taxed.
Thus in a world in which taxable income is defined in money rather
than in real terms , the equity of exempting or taxing inflationary capital
gains in terms of relative tax burdens depends upon the illustrations
2
considered, so that no clear rule emerges. Musgrave concludes that
It is clear enough as a matter of principle that all assets and liabilities
should be adjusted for changes in price level and that accretion
[taxable income] should be measured in real terms. Yet it is hardly
possible in practice to carry out all these adjustments. With minor
exceptions such as inventory evaluation, the income concept is, in
effect, defined in money terms. In view of this, equity may be
impaired rather than improved by piecemeal adjustments to allow for
price-level change in selected parts of the system.
In other words, since taxable income is no more than an imperfect
and somewhat arbitrary index of taxpaying capacity, if practicality (or
ideology, for that matter) causes taxable income to be defined in money
terms, then simple consistency in the use of this index requires that
inflationary gains be taxed as just another component of taxable income.
In other words, since general price level changes do not affect the
money value of fixed dollar claims (debts and loans) and therefore do not
generate capital gains and losses on fixed dollar claims, price level change
redistributions of real income from holders of fixed dollar claims (creditors)
to holders of real dollar claims (property owners) will be included in a money
income measurement of relative taxpaying capacity only if taxable income
fully includes inflationary gains (and deducts deflationary losses) on real
dollar claims. See Heller, "Investors' Decisions, Equity, and the Capital
Gains Tax" (1955), p. 393; and Goffman, "The Taxation of Capital Gains:
An Economic Analysis" (1962), p. 241.
For some intriguing capital gains taxation policy recommendations based
on an initial assumption that inflationary gains should not be taxed, see
Gottleib, "On Reform of the American Capital Gains Tax" (1958), pp. 338-350.
2
Musgrave, Public Finance
, p. 169. Also see pp. 334-335.
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Furthermore, one might argue that in the absence of a clear rule in equity,
simplicity should determine tax policy. In this case, the difficulty of
distinguishing inflationary from non-inflationary gains argues for taxing
both types of gains .
The oelief that inflationary gains should not be taxed is widely accepted
even by those favoring at least some tax on non-inflated gains. Congress-
ional belief that taxing inflationary gains is inequitable has resulted in
several discriminatory provisions pertaining to real estate gains. Capital
gain on the sale of a taxpayer's principal residence is not taxable if the
proceeds from the sale are reinvested in a new residence within one year
before or after the date of sale. The taxpayer is allowed an unlimited number
of untaxed transactions, but if before reaching age 65 he once sells a
residence without reinvesting the proceeds in a new home, the capital gain
previously accrued on all of his residences is taxable. However, gain on
the first $2 0,000 of the proceeds from the sale of a house by a taxpayer 65
or older is tax-free, regardless of how the money is used, if the house was
his principal residence for at least five of the preceding eight years.
Such provisions clearly discriminate against the homeowner who wants
to sell, and rent a new home. They discriminate much more severely against
the renter who owns no assets whose capital gains (if any) will be tax-free;
inflation will certainly raise rents if it raises the cost of replacing an owned
home. Of course, the apparent Congressional belief that all increases in a
residence's value are due to a general inflation of housing costs is at least
debatable; many residences have appreciated due to new industry, improvement
of schools or construction of highways, or population influx.
23
Averaging gains and losses. A graduated tax rate structure taxes an
income which fluctuates greatly from year to year more heavily than it taxes
a non -fluctuating income, even if both income streams are equal on the
average. Consequently, a major argument favoring special tax treatment
of long-term capital gains has been that taxing a gain accrued over many
years but realized in one year would be horizontally inequitable at
ordinary income tax rates, since gains often would cause taxable income
to fluctuate across rate brackets.
Present tax law's favorable treatment of capital gains is far more
generous than needed to assure such horizontal equity between recipients
of fluctuating capital gains and of nonfluctuating ordinary income. On the
other hand, present law does nothing to provide horizontal equity between
recipients of fluctuating and of nonfluctuating capital gains (if the
fluctuations are over a graduated tax rate structure; that is if they do not
fall entirely above the income level at which the 2 5 percent maximum
capital gains tax rate becomes effective).
The income-bunching defense of special treatment for capital gains and
losses is fallacious. Gains accrued over several years can easily be averaged,
and special treatment is not an equitable substitute for averaging anyway.
For a discussion of capital gain and loss averaging, see Goode,
p. 199. For a general discussion of averaging devices applicable to all
income or to capital gains and losses alone, see David, Alternative Approaches
,
pp. 166-183, 216-219; and Steger, "Averaging Income for Income Tax Purposes"
(1959), I, pp. 599-607. For a specific averaging technique for capital gains
and losses, see Folsom , "A Procedure for Averaging Capital Gains and Losses
for Income Tax Purposes" (1969).
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Equity Versus Special Treatment
Such attempts to defend the equity of present tax law's special favorable
treatment of capital gains -- whether based upon assertions that, somehow,
gains are not income, upon national income accounting concepts, upon beliefs
that gains due to interest rate changes or due to inflation are "illusory, " or
upon special treatment as a substitute for averaging gains accrued over many
years but realized in one year -- are not persuasive. These arguments against
heavier capital gains taxation miss the central equity issue -- special
treatment's effect on the relative distribution of taxpayers' burdens.
Special treatment of capital gains as generous as in present tax law
inevitably assigns relative tax burdens capriciously, violating any reasonable
index of taxpaying ability. The extremely unequal distribution of gains and
losses among individuals with identical total incomes makes special
treatment very inequitable horizontally. Partially taxed gains together with
partially deductible losses are doubly unfair: many who enjoy the lightly
taxed gains of a bull market get out in time and do not suffer the negligibly
deductible losses of a crash. Also, particularly in a period of rising interest
rates, some investors may invest for heavily taxed ordinary income but
receive minimally deductible losses instead.
Special treatment is also inequitable vertically if any degree of income
tax progressivity is equitable, since special treatment disrupts income tax
For historical evidence, see Seltzer, pp. 115-128, 152-155. Also see
Break, "On the Deductibility of Capital Losses Under the Federal Income Tax"
(1952), pp. 214-229; David, Alternative Approaches, pp. 140-143, 223-224.
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progressivity violently. The higher the income bracket, the greater the
proportion of lightly taxed capital gains. Even in the pre-income tax 1800's,
when there was no tax advantage in receiving capital gains instead of
ordinary income, they "played such an outstanding role in the creation of
2
large fortunes as to suggest that they have been their main source. " In
recent years, realized gains usually have run from 3 to 4 percent of total
income (including gains) for all income classes, but 60 percent of incomes
exceeding $500,000. Evidence indicates that special treatment of realized
gains makes the federal income tax regressive for incomes above $2 00,000,




Some may argue that with ordinary income tax rates ranging up to 70
percent, some progressivity reduction is desirable. But special capital
gain and loss treatment reduces only average progressivity, violating the
horizontal equity principle that financial equals should be taxed somewhat
alike.
In the face of the available evidence of the enormity of the inequities





U. S. Treasury Department, Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of
Income: Individual Income Tax Returns for 1959-1962, Tables 15, 15, 16
and 10 respectively; Goode, pp. 194-195, 236, 326; and Musgrave, "How
Progressive is the Income Tax?" (1959), III, p. 2227.
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heavier gains taxation would be inequitable are almost heroic. But austract
philosophizing about the meaning of the word "income" does not yield a
reasonable assignment of relative tax burdens. The taxpayer with gains is
better off than the taxpayer without gains, who is better off than the
taxpayer with losses, regardless of their source — whether or not they are
"illusory" or "unreal. "
TAX LAW COMPLEXITY 1
Perhaps the greatest disadvantage of special treatment of capital gains
and losses is the real economic burden of the overwhelming complexity which
special treatment has introduced into federal income tax law. The obvious
results are government tax administration costs, taxpayer compliance costs,
and resources privately misallocated by taxpayer attempts to avoid taxes.
All these results have grave consequences for economic efficiency, national
output, and economic growth.
Tax law complexity requires government to devote resources to devising,
explaining, and publicizing statutory provisions, executive regulations and
rulings, and judicial interpretations. It requires taxpayers to devote resources
to examining, studying, and analyzing this whole body of tax law to apply it
to their own affairs. It encourages taxpayers to ferret out legal arrangements
of their affairs which will reduce their tax liabilities through tax avoidance
techniques at first unsuspected by government. And it inspires taxpayers to
For additional discussion, seeFolsom, The Full Inclusion , chapter III;
David, Alternative Approaches , chapter II, and pp. 116-128.
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corrupt political processes by pressuring lawmakers to change, qualify,
expand, and nullify complicated details of statutes, regulations, and
rulings, to facilitate their own tax avoidance techniques.
But society as a whole cannot avoid the burden of its collective
consumption of resources by government. Each individual tax avoidance
may be insignificant in size and unnoticed by the electorate, but the
aggregate deeply erodes the income tax base, necessitating higher tax
rates which would be noticed by the electorate. Legislative, executive,
and judicial lawmakers strive to conserve the tax base by continually
revising statutes and regulations, by handing out new Treasury rulings, and
by "tightening" interpretations. These opposing efforts to erode and
conserve the tax base continually alter the tax law -- making administration
and compliance even more difficult and generating an enormous volume of
tax litigation to clog the courts and divert them from more important
responsibilities
.
Resource misallocations due to tax law complexity are not limited to
the large amounts of the economy's scarcest resource -- educated mental
ability -- thus consumed by tax law administration and compliance. In
striving to avoid taxes, the economy's private producers are seduced into
otherwise uneconomic actions. If tax avoidance is easier in one industry
than in another, the first industry's output will be relatively too large. If
tax complexity generates uncertainty about the tax consequences of some
real investments, real capital allocation becomes less a function of expected
real costs and demands and more a function of the drafting quality of various
statutes, regulations, rulings, and court decisions.
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Defining Capital Gain and Loss
Special treatment of capital gains and losses complicates the whole
body of legislative, executive, and judicial tax law for several reasons.
Rigorously distinguishing capital gains from ordinary income is imperative
if the taxpayer's natural desire to classify all receipts as capital gain
instead of ordinary income is ever to be frustrated. Yet since a realized
capital gain results from the sale of a stream of future ordinary income, the
definitional problem is overwhelming. The law allowing, everyone would
sell all rights to future ordinary income and convert that income to capital
gain.
The definitional difficulty of taxing capital gains at lower rates than
ordinary income has been likened to the definitional difficulty which would
arise from taxing wages at lower rates than salaries. For over forty years
Congress has struggled — sometimes valiantly --to draw a clear line
between capital gains and ordinary income, but the Internal Revenue Code
does not contain one yet. Instead of a clear definition of capital gain and
loss, we have an enormous volume of statutory, administrative, and judicial
law classifying various sales of rights to future receipts as to whether they
generate ordinary income or capital gains.
Apparently, income from personal services or business activity or from
holding investment property should be ordinary income, while the profit from
selling investment property should be capital gain. This vague distinction
By Carl S. Shoup in Federal Tax Policy for Economic Growth and
Stability (Hearings, 1955), p. 345.
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has proved impossible to draft into law. Instead the statute states that
capital gains and losses result from the "sale or exchange" of a "capital
asset; 1 defined to include any and all tangible and intangible property not
specifically excluded by the statute. In general, the statute excludes land
or depreciable property used, or inventory or other property held for sale
to customers, in the ordinary course of a trade or business. This residual
definition is under constant attack either for excluding too much or too
little. The taxpayer enjoying a gain argues that he has sold a nonexcluded
(capital) asset; the taxpayer suffering a loss argues that it is fully deductible
against ordinary income because he has sold an excluded (non-capital) asset.
The statute provides explicitly that accounts receivable are not capital
assets, and the courts hold that sale of a contractual right to either future or
Although not capital assets, land and depreciable real and personal
property used in a trade or business can generate capital gains and ordinary
losses. Gains on land (on which depreciation deductions cannot be taken)
are capital gains. On depreciable real property such as a building, gains
(over the book value) up to what the book value of the property would be under
straight line depreciation are treated as a recovery of excessive accelerated
depreciation deductions (which were taken against ordinary income) and are
taxed as ordinary income; gains above the straight line book value are capital
gains. On depreciable personal property, gains (over the book value) up to
the original purchase price are treated as a recovery of ordinary income
depreciation deductions and are taxed as ordinary income; gains above the
original purchase price are capital gains. On all such property, losses are
fully deductible from ordinary income
.
2
See Slitor, "Problems of Definition under the Capital Gains Tax "
(1957), pp. 26-37. Also see Surrey, "Definitional Problems in Capital
Gains Taxation" (1959); Eustace and Lyon , "Assignment of Income: Fruit
and Tree as Irrigated by the P. G. Lake Case" (1962); "Notes: Distinguishing
Ordinary Income from Capital Gain Where Rights to Future Income are Sold"
(19 56); Miller, "Capital Gains Taxation of the Fruits of Personal Effort:
Before and Under the 1954 Code" (1954), and "The Capital Asset Concept:
A Critique of Capital Gains Taxation" (19S0). For attempts to write improved
definitions see Silverstein, "The Capital Asset Definition" (1959); and Surrey
and Warren, "The Income Tax Project of the American Law Institute" (1953).
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overdue ordinary income is sale of a noncapital asset. Then does the
consideration received in exchange for the sale or cancellation of some other
contractual right (such as a lease, distributorship, or other right to use or
buy or sell something) yield ordinary income or capital gain? To what
extent must a taxpayer sever his connection with a property in order to
have sold or exchanged it — are oil royalties income or are they capital
gains from the installment sale of a capital asset?
fust what is a customer, and when is a taxpayer in the ordinary course
of his trade or business? Illustrative complexities here draw fine lines
between being in the real estate business and investing in real estate,
between routine business hedging and long-term speculating on organized
commodity markets, between being in the lending business and investing in
bonds. Furthermore, the existence of favored categories of receipts places
apparently irresistible pressures on Congress to extend capital gain treatment,
for example, to coal and timber royalties, stock options, lump-sum withdrawals
from pension plans, and sales of patents (but not copyrights).
Converting Ordinary Income into Capital Gain
Special treatment makes possible a host of tax avoidance techniques
which taxpayers may have only begun to discover, embrace, and battle for.
The nonintegrated corporate and individual income tax structure has created
innumerable opportunities for converting ordinary income into capital gains
by accumulating ordinary income in a corporation (or partnership). Taxpayer
ingenuity has required an incredibly complex income tax statute, including
a penalty tax on "unreasonably" accumulated surplus and special levies on
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"personal" holding companies -- as distinguished from "bona fide" holding
companies and financial intermediaries such as banks, savings institutions,
and finance and insurance companies. Other provisions deal with "collapsible"
corporations and partnerships, set up to transform profit on the sale of
ordinary business inventory (such as a movie) from ordinary income into
capital gain. Taxpayer attempts to distribute a corporation's retained earn-
ings as capital gains instead of ordinary dividend income have generated a
maze of arbitrary "rule of thumb" provisions dealing with liquidation
distributions, security redemptions , and recapitalizations .
This large collection of provisions is almost incomprehensively complex.
Yet at least according to ubiquitous tax advice literature currently available
in vast quantities, ways to "convert" ordinary income into capital gain
continue to abound.
Tax law complexities due to special treatment are directed primarily
at smaller rather than large publicly held corporations. Yet even if this were
not the case, complexity would inevitably fall with special severity upon
small and new business.
Every time a difficult provision is put forward, every time an obscure
regulation is drafted, and every time we have a court decision of
doubtful meaning, the smaller taxpayer suffers the most.
. . . It is
frequently impossible for the small taxpayer to make the outlays to
fight his case, whereas the taxpayer with a great deal more [dollars]
at stake can afford to pay for the various professional services
required to present his case properly.
Peloubet, "The Relation of Depreciation Policies to Business
Concentration" (1950), pp. 60-61.
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Since separate sections of the income tax law are highly interrelated,
each complication spawns many others. The available evidence indicates
that a draft of an income tax statute omitting special treatment of capital
gains and losses and its attendant complications would be spectacularly
short. Almost indisputably, special treatment does more to complicate the
tax law than all other tax preferences combined. Its elimination is probably
the largest step toward income tax law simplification which could be enacted.
A capital gain in the context of an income tax is a wholly arbitrary
concept created exclusively by the tax law. . . . Both capital gains
and ordinary income are improvements in economic position, and since
the two cannot be distinguished on this — their essential attribute —
the law must have recourse to other characteristics. These, however,
will be matters of form and therefore often in the control of the taxpayers;
and so the law feels compelled to erect rather elaborate barriers to
restrict taxpayers 1 freedom to maneuver into the capital gain territory.
Taxpayers naturally continue to explore for ways around these barriers
,
and as new holes become exploited, the law builds additional barriers.
The whole process seems to be almost self-sustaining. In any event,
it keeps the law well supplied with complexities. . . . There is bound
to be great pressure to broaden the capital gains category, and since
such classification is necessarily arbitrary, the demands will be
difficult to resist. This has been the history of our capital gains
provisions. .... A capital gain is merely some form of income taxed at
a bargain rate.
The tax law's inability to distinguish clearly between capital gains
and ordinary income inevitably confuses both tax administrator and taxpayer.
The timid taxpayer overpays, the clever taxpayer underpays, and the
unlucky taxpayer winds up in court. Unfortunately, the judge also may be
confused.
1
See Stone, HA Comprehensive Income Tax Base for the U. S. ? : Implica-
tions of the Report on -the Royal Commission on Taxation" (19 69), pp. 29-3 0.




Capital gains tax policy affects the mobility of financial capital in
two major ways. First, special treatment of capital gains and losses
distorts rates of return on alternative investments, and thus distorts the
profitability of alternative real investment projects. Second, capital gains
taxation disturbs securities prices in several ways, thus changing the
ability of different firms to finance real investment in new plant and
equipment. Consequently, heavier capital gains taxation on balance might
—
or might not — significantly affect the real investment projects which do find
financing and are carried out.
Rates of return on financial investments, securities prices, and the
resulting financial flows of money capital throughout the economy are not
particularly important in themselves. The importance of financial flows is
that money capital finances real investments in physical capital. Thus if
taxation disrupts financial flows of money capital, it will affect the
economy's choice of alternative real investments. Poor tax policy will
misallocate economic resources.
Rates of Return on Alternative Investments
Present tax law's special favorable treatment of capital gains probably
disrupts the mobility of financial capital most severely by distorting the
after-tax rates of return on alternative financial and real investments. For
example, limited deductibility of capital losses discourages high-risk
investments. But more important is that capital gains tax rates range from
David, Alternative Approaches , pp. 193-197.
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5 down to 3 6 percent of ordinary income tax rates. This tax rate differential
disrupts financial capital movements in two ways.
First, this differential can make an investment yielding a moderate
before-taxes return as a capital gain more attractive than another investment
yielding a much larger before-taxes return as ordinary income. Industries
with the most deserving investment projects may be those least able to
arrange a return in the form of capital gains. Historically, the motion picture
production industry has been unusually successful in arranging its profits in
the form of capital gains, yet there is little reason to suppose that this
industry's real investments have been more productive than real investments
elsewhere.
The second disruption of financial capital movements due to the gains-
income income tax rate differential occurs because corporate retained earnings
generate capital gains while dividends are ordinary income. A presently
profitable industry whose investment opportunities are expected to generate
only moderate future returns may retain most of its earnings, even though
2
other industries have more productive investment opportunities. Tax-
conscious stockholders will prefer earnings retention unless the expected
profitability of investments in other industries is great enough to compensate
for the tax penalty on taking profits as ordinary dividend income.
David, "Economic Effects of the Capital Gains Tax" (1964), pp.
295-297, and "Evaluating Structural Changes in Capital Gains Taxation'
(1965), pp. 646-649, and Alternative Approaches , pp. 247-257.
See Brittain, Corporate Dividend Policy (1966).
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Of course, to some extent firms in poor investment opportunity
industries may diversify into other industries. But insofar as diversification
occurs because of tax considerations, it must involve substantial real
economic costs. The administrative inefficiencies of attempts to manage
overly heterogeneous operations are notorious. Furthermore, uneconomic
diversifications and mergers may impair workable competition.
Admittedly, heavier capital gains taxation might cause a larger
dividend payout of corporate profits, which might encourage consumption
spending, reduce saving, and thus retard economic growth. Also, even aside
from its effects on dividends, heavier capital gains taxation probably would
decrease individuals' private saving more than it would decrease consumption.
In either case, an adjustment of other taxes or of fiscal and monetary policies
could maintain the desired level of saving.
A given level of real net national product can be achieved with either
low or high levels of saving and investment and rates of economic growth, by
using either "loose" fiscal and "tight" monetary policies to generate high
interest rates, or "tight" fiscal and "loose" monetary policies to generate low
interest rates. (Samuelson, Economics (1967), pp. 330-332, 589.) Despite
this well known result of John R. Hicks' IS-LM analysis, recent capital gains
tax literature has expressed much concern that heavier gains taxation would
seriously reduce saving. See Wallich, "Taxation of Capital Gains, " pp. 143-
145. (For a critique of Wallich's multi-faceted argument, see Blum, "Taxation
of Capital Gains . . . Some Observations" together with Wallich's "Rejoinder"
(1965).) For a critique of Wallich's use of John J. Arena's econometric consump-
tion function studies of the effect of realized and unrealized capital gains on
consumer spending, to "show" that taxation of realized capital gains falls
hardly at all upon consumption and almost entirely upon saving, see Folsom,
"Capital Gains, Consumption, Capital Gains Taxes and the Supply of Saving"
(1966), pp. 434-436; for a brief discussion of saving stimulants, see pp.
436-437. Also see Wallich's "Rejoinder" (1966). For further expression of
concern about the effect of heavier gains taxation upon saving, see Slitor,
"The Carter Proposals on Capital Gains: Economic Effects and Policy Implica-
tions for the United States" (1969), pp. 73-77; for a rebuttal see Harberger,




Capital gains taxation may affect the behavior of securities markets
in several ways. It may change the demand to hold securities, the demand
to acquire securities, the supply of existing securities offered for sale by
securities holders, the supply of new securities issued by business firms,
and also the short and long run dynamic processes by which securities
markets react to short and long run disequilibrium.
The available literature pays some attention to the effect of capital
gains taxation upon the demand — to hold and to acquire -- securities,
devotes the bulk of its attention to gains taxation's effect upon the supply
of existing securities offered for sale by securities holders
,
gives little
more than passing attention to gains taxation's effect upon the supply of
new securities issued by business firms, and virtually ignores gains
taxation's effect upon dynamic processes.
The effect of capital gains taxation upon securities markets to which
the literature devotes the bulk of its attention, the effect upon the supply
of existing securities offered for sale by securities holders , is usually
called the "lock-in" effect. This label is used to describe both a temporary
postponement effect and a permanent effect, both reducing the supply of
existing securities offered for sale by securities holders.
Taxing long term capital gains (gains on assets held more than six
months) at effective rates no more than half as high as those on short term
gains constitutes a definite incentive to postpone realizations for as much
This section is a condensed version of the analysis presented in
Folsom, "The Effect of Capital Gains Taxation upon Securities Markets: A
Critical Review of the Theoretical Literature" (1968).
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1 2
as six months. Similarly, exempting accrued gains unrealized at death
discourages taxpayers desiring to maximize the value of their estates for
their heirs from selling securities . Such incentives to postpone capital
gains realizations certainly tend to reduce the supply of existing securities
offered for sale by securities holders, and presumably have substantial
effects upon the behavior of securities markets.
However, substantially higher long term capital gains tax rates
together with taxing accrued capital gains at death would minimize capital
gains taxation's temporary postponement effects. Therefore, the following
discussion focuses upon gains taxation's "permanent" effect, assuming
capital gains tax rates which do not decline (or which decline too far in
the future to affect investors' current decisions and securities markets'
current behavior). More precisely, the following discussion imagines a
capital gains tax rate structure which eliminates the distinction between
This postponement effect apparently is substantial. For estimates
of its magnitude, see Hinrichs, "An Empirical Measure of Investors'
Responsiveness to Differentials in Capital Gains Tax Rates Among Income
Groups" (1963): Folsom, "The Effect of Capital Gains Taxes upon Securities
Markets, Gains Realizations, and Tax Revenues — A Comment upon One of
Harley H. Hinrichs 1 Empirical Studies" (1968); and Fredland, Gray, and
Sunley, "The Six Month Holding Period for Capital Gains: An Empirical
Analysis of its Effect on the Timing of Gains" (1968). Hinrichs presents data
suggesting that reducing the differential between the short and long term
capital gains tax rate by reducing the short term rate would alter the timing
of security market transactions, stimulating short instead of long term
realizations so much that tax revenues would increase.
2
The untaxed unrealized capital gains of 1967 decedents have been
estimated as $16,540 billion. See Bernard Okun, "The Taxation of Decedents
Unrealized Capital Gains" (1967), p. 385. For other estimates, see David,
Alternative Approaches
,
pp. 60-61, 93-103, 242-246.
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short and long term gains (for example by taxing long term gains at the same
rates as short term gains) and which levies fully upon accrued capital gains
at death.
Aside from postponement incentives, any capital gains taxation will
discourage taxpayers from selling securities, and will have consequences
for securities prices' behavior over time and relative to each other. Briefly,
the argument is as follows: For administrative reasons, capital gains taxes
become due and payable not as the capital gain accrues , but only when the
asset is sold and the gain is realized. In a sense, the tax is a voluntary
transfer tax, since it can be avoided by not selling the securities. Therefore,
depending on expectations about future securities prices, the capital gains
tax may discourage the taxpayer from selling his security -- he is "locked-
inl' Conversely, if his security has declined, the possibility of deducting
his loss may encourage him to sell. In short, capital gains taxation dis-
torts the "terms of trade" between the security the taxpayer is holding (with
an accrued gain or loss) and other securities.
That capital gains taxation discourages a taxpayer from selling a
security -- since doing so realizes a taxable capital gain -- is clear.
Several models showing how the magnitude of this capital gains tax "lock-
in" effect varies with the taxpayer's expectations about future prices of
his security, about future prices of alternative securities, about securities
prices after six months (so that the low long term rather than the high short
term tax rate is applicable), about his own mortality (and the opportunity
for his estate to escape gains taxes), and about future changes in effective
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tax rates, have been constructed and analyzed.
Nevertheless , despite the existence of such models of the individual
investor, and despite a large literature on the subject of capital gains
taxation and the securities markets, models really adequate to analyze the
consequences for the behavior of securities markets of this capital gains
tax lock-in effect upon the supply of securities offered by individual investors
have not been presented. The problem of capital gains taxation's effect upon
securities markets has been discussed, but never rigorously enough to permit
a clear judgment, or even a solid debate, as to whether gains taxation's
consequences are serious. In the resulting absence of any consensus among
economists about the major consequences of taxing capital gains, Congress —
largely in response to fears that heavier capital gains taxation would have
"serious" consequences for the securities markets -- continues to tax
capital gains (on assets held more than six months) at remarkably preferential
rates, in comparison with the rates on ordinary income. The costs of this
policy, in terms of equity considerations, tax law complexity, and inefficient
allocations of real investment among alternative capital projects, may be
substantial. The need for careful and convincing analysis confirming or
denying Congressional fears about the securities market consequences of
heavier capital gains taxation is very real and definite.
The commodity-tax analysis . The available analysis of the effect of
capital gains taxation upon securities markets is a straightforward adaptation
For an example and bibliography, see Beazer, "Expected Income
Changes and the Lock-In Effect of the Capital Gains Tax" (1966), pp. SOS-
SIS. Also see David, Alternative Approaches , pp. 128-140, 225.
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of the usual demand and supply analysis of an excise tax on an ordinary
commodity. This simple graphical comparative statics analysis (comparing
securities market equilibrium positions under various alternative capital gains
tax assumptions) assumes that although gains taxation decreases the demand
for securities, the decrease in demand is relatively small because the buyer's
future tax on his expected profits is distant and generally unknown. Gains
taxation's primary effect is to shift the supply of securities offered for sale
within an interval of time upward in a way which makes it steeper, because
potential capital gains tax liabilities increase as securities prices rise.
This analysis has discovered two major consequences of realized
capital gains taxation for securities markets. First, gains taxation will
distort the price of one security relative to that of another, thus altering
the relative ease with which different firms can obtain new financing. Second,
gains taxation will cause security market prices to fluctuate more widely than
they otherwise would, which may generate cycles in real capital goods indus-
tries and interfere with the stability of long-run capital formation.
The first consequence of the shift in supply — that relative security
prices will be distorted — occurs because the resulting reduction in sales
The original presentation of this analysis was by Somers, "An
Economic Analysis of the Capital Gains Tax" (1948). Later discussions have
criticized, amended, and expanded Somers' analysis, but have accepted his
graphical comparative statics single market methodology. See Folsom, "The
Effect of Capital Gains Taxation upon Securities Markets: A Critical Review
of the Theoretical Literature" (1968).
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is greater for appreciated securities. Thus gains taxation, by dispropor-
tionately reducing sales of appreciated securities, keeps their prices up,
and simultaneously reduces demand for unappreciated securities and keeps
their prices down. Even if the old appreciated securities are those of firms
in relatively obsolete or stagnant industries which have "seen their day"
and now are faced by relatively unattractive opportunities for physical
investment, while the unappreciated securities are those of firms in new
rapidly growing industries which are faced by relatively very productive
opportunities for physical investment, gains taxation will deter the holders
of securities in the old industries from selling and purchasing securities
in the new industries
.
The heavier capital gains taxation is, the higher the prices of old
industry securities will be, and the lower the prices of new industry
securities will be. As a result of such distortion of security prices, firms
in the old industries with the least attractive investment opportunities will
be able to raise financial capital more easily, and firms in the new
industries with the most productive investment opportunities will be able
to raise financial capital less easily than if capital gains taxation were
lower or nonexistent.
Thus , by distorting relative security prices , heavier capital gains
taxation may distort financial flows and misallocate the resources available
for physical investment, for example by reducing the "cost of capital" for
old previously successful firms (whose securities will have appreciated)
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and thereby increasing the cost of capital for new ventures.
The second consequence of the shift in supply — that price fluctuations
over time will be larger — occurs because with a steeper supply curve, shifts
in demand will have a larger effect on prices and a smaller effect on transactions
volume. Insofar as heavier gains taxation would make securities prices
fluctuate more widely and move more closely with the business cycle, heavier
gains taxation would reduce the cost of capital while capital goods industries
are already booming, and raise it while they are retrenching, thus magnifying
the instability of these industries and destabilizing the economy as a whole.
Critique of the commodity-tax analysis . In what circumstances, and to
what extent, does capital gains taxation really distort relative security prices
in ways which make it more difficult for new ventures to find financing? And
does it really magnify securities market fluctuations? Considering not only
the lock-in effect upon the supply of securities but also considering gains
taxation's effect upon the demand for securities and upon dynamic processes,
the foregoing discussion is not entirely convincing.
The effect of capital gains taxation upon relative security prices must
depend not only upon supply but also upon demand considerations, and
This implication of the argument is by Martin David, "Economic Effects
of the Capital Gains Tax, " pp. 293, 294. But David notes that the lock-in
effect, even if large, will be unimportant insofar as new saving, instead of
"trickling down" to new issues (flowing first to the purchase of old appreciated
blue chips — whose holders are locked-in — which must be sold to finance
new issues) flows directly to the new issues. Somers' rebuttal probably would
be that because of capital gains taxation's distortion of relative security prices,
the funds flowing to new issues will tend to flow to new issues of old firms,
rather than to new issues of new firms.
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it is at least possible that capital gains taxation's demand effects will tend
to offset its supply effects enough that on balance prices change little. For
example, gains taxation may tend to shift each security's demand and supply
leftward to the same extent. Also, assuming that the demand and supply for
each security are functions not only of its own price but also of other
security prices so that changes in one price affect demand and supply for
many different securities , a multi-market analysis may show that gains
taxation could cause market interactions which tend to be self-cancelling.
Such offsetting may be improbable, but the bare possibility suggests that
simple speculations as to the effects of gains taxation upon the relative
security prices of different kinds of firms may be misleading.
Similarly, gains taxation's influence upon fluctuations in security
market prices over time will depend not only upon the steepness of the
supply curve, but also upon gains taxation's effect upon the demand curve.
For example, the "capital effect" of capital gains tax liabilities on realized
gains will reduce the funds available for reinvestment and thus decrease
demand; loss deductibility, by reducing taxpayers' other tax liabilities,
will increase the funds available for reinvestment and thus increase demand.
Considering this capital effect, it is not clear that the effect of gains
taxation upon demand will be small relative to its effect upon supply,
or that gains taxation's primary impact upon securities markets will be
via its effect upon supply. Given the capital effect, taxation of realized
capital gains may moderate the rise of a bull market — or accentuate
the fall of a bear market. Deduction of realized capital losses may
Gemmill, "The Effect of the Capital Gains Tax on Asset Prices"
(1953), pp. 298-299.
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stimulate a bull market --or prop a bear market. Gains taxation may
either moderate or magnify market fluctuations.
More fundamental, methodological, criticisms of the commodity-tax
analysis of capital gains taxation's effect upon securities markets are as
follows. First, this analysis (and also the literature criticizing it)
typically ignores the distinction between stocks and flows, and therefore
it relies upon conceptions of equilibrium and disequilibrium which are
incomplete and inadequate. Second, conclusions about gains taxation's
effects upon the behaviour of securities markets over time are dynamic in
nature, and really do not follow from the comparative statics analysis
used. A more adequate theoretical model of capital gains taxation's
effects upon securities markets — a multi- market model which devotes
sufficient attention to demand as well as to supply, which distinguishes
between stocks and flows, and which considers dynamic processes in
the short and long run -- is clearly needed.
The need for a stock-flow analysis . The commodity-tax analysis of
capital gains taxation focuses exclusively on "investment" demand and
supply: the demandsto acquire existing securities within some interval of
time, and the offers to sell existing securities within some interval of time.
This model is in complete equilibrium whenever it is in investment equilibrium,
that is, whenever the quantity of acquisitions demanded per time interval by
The following discussion is based upon the stock-flow models of
Bushaw and Clower, Introduction to Mathematical Economics (1957),
chapter II.
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those desiring additional holdings equals the quantity of offerings supplied
per time interval by those desiring fewer holdings.
The difficulty with this model applied to a durable item such as a
security is that investment equilibrium is a short run concept, because as
soon as securities have flowed from those desiring fewer holdings to those
desiring additional holdings, the flow of securities will cease. In addition
to investment demand and supply and investment equilibrium, a model of a
market for a durable item should also include stock demand (the total
"reservation" demand to hold a stock of the item at a point in time, by
those holding them and by those not holding them), stock supply (the total
existing stock of securities available at a point in time to be held by any-
one), and the intermediate run concept of stock equilibrium (in which stock
demand equals stock supply). Investment demand and supply are derived
from the stock demands of those whose holdings are greater than they desire
and those whose holdings are less than they desire. Since investment
demand and supply depend upon stock demand and supply, the short run
prices set in investment equilibrium must depend upon stock demand and
supply. Prices in the intermediate run stock equilibrium depend not upon
transitory market run current investment flows between demanders and
suppliers of existing securities, but rather upon the stock demands of
everyone in the market.
A securities market model which excludes stock demand and supply,
excludes the basic determinants of market run investment equilibrium and
can be used only for a preliminary superficial analysis of the effect of
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gains taxation upon investment equilibrium prices. Such a model cannot
analyse the effect of gains taxation upon stock equilibrium prices at all.
In addition to investment demand and supply and stock demand and
supply, a complete analysis of the market for a durable requires a third set
of concepts: flow demand (the demand to consume the commodity within some
interval of time), flow supply (the supply of new output within some interval
of time), and long run flow equilibrium (in which consumption equals
production). For a securities market, there will not be any consumption of
or demand to consume securities, but the supply of new securities -- the
quantity of additional securities issued -- may be positive (if firms are
issuing new securities) or negative (if firms are retiring securities). A
securities market is in flow equilibrium only if securities are neither being
issued nor retired. If a market is not in flow equilibrium, the stock supply
available to hold will change.
Although in an intermediate run analysis changes in the stock of
securities can perhaps be disregarded, some attention should be paid to
such flows, since they do occur -- their occurrence controls the long run
equilibrium prices of securities, and in fact their occurrence is the
primary economic justification for the existence of securities markets.
Securities market models which exclude flow demand and supply are not
really capable of assessing the effect of capital gains taxation upon
issues of new securities.
The need for a dynamic analysis . Implicit in the foregoing discussion
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of the need for a stock-flow analysis of the effect of capital gains taxation
upon securities markets is the assumption that the analysis would have to
be dynamic. Any discussion of the effect of short run equilibrium prices
upon stock demand and thus upon investment demand and supply, or upon
flow demand and supply and thus upon stock supply, inevitably entails
interactions which inextricably involve time in an essential way. The
point of a stock-flow analysis is to analyse the effects of stocks carried
over from one time period to another upon subsequent economic activity.
Aside from the idea that a stock-flow analysis inevitably involves
dynamics, the effect of capital gains taxation upon securities markets is
a problem which needs to be approached with a dynamic model. First,
although the effect of gains taxation upon relative security prices may be
construed narrowly to deal only with relative prices in equilibrium, a more
useful analysis would deal with gains taxation's effect upon relative
security prices in disequilibrium as well as in equilibrium. Much, perhaps
most, new financing occurs while financial markets are far away from long-
run equilibrium. Second, the literature has already argued that gains
taxation magnifies fluctuations in security prices, and this conclusion is
inevitably dynamic in the sense that it involves the effect of gains taxation
upon the behavior of security prices over time. Fluctuations in security
market prices may occur not only or even primarily because of changes in
the market's equilibrium position, but because of its disequilibrium move-
ments. Also, insofar as movements in security prices are reactions to
disequilibrium conditions, the dynamic effect of gains taxation upon price
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movements will depend upon the effect of gains taxation upon the way in
which the market reacts to disequilibrium -- for example, depending upon
the effect of gains taxation upon speculation about future prices, and the
effect of speculation upon price movements
.
Nevertheless, although the available analyses of capital gains
taxation's consequences for security markets — relative prices and
fluctuations over time -- are grossly inadequate, taxation of realized
capital gains undoubtedly has some effects upon securities markets, and
these effects may interfere with the mobility of financial capital.
Empirical evidence . The severity of capital gains taxation's effects
upon security markets is an empirical question. Unfortunately the available
statistical estimates are conflicting and contradictory, perhaps because
they rest upon an inadequate theoretical foundation.
New York Stock Exchange studies have used "depth interviews " to
generate evidence of a very large capital gains tax "lock-in" effect upon
the supply of securities offered for sale: a lower long term capital gains
tax rate would "unlock" such a large volume of capital gains that tax
revenue would increase substantially.
See the New York Stock Exchange studies in the list of references,
below.
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U. S. Treasury figures show a much smaller lock-in effect; a lower
1
long-term capital gains tax rate would decrease tax revenue. The Treasury
has not publicly explained how it obtained its estimate, although private
discussions and correspondence indicate that a regression analysis plus a
substantial amount of judgment was involved.
The difference between the Exchange and Treasury results is at least
partially explainable. The Exchange estimates are for the first year after
the gains tax rate cut (although the Exchange's data cause it to "expect
lower capital gains tax rates to lead to permanently higher levels of sales
U. S. President, 1961-1963 (Kennedy), President's 1963 Tax Message ,
Hearings , pp. 71, 365, 386, 708; U. S. Congress, House Committee on Ways
and Means, Legislative History of H. R. 8363, 88th Congress, The Revenue
Act of 1964, Public Law 88-272 , Parti, pp. 184, 235. The Treasury estimated
that President Kennedy's proposals to reduce individuals' long-term capital
gains tax rates (by reducing the included amount from 5 to 3 percent and by
reducing ordinary income tax rates) would reduce tax revenue by $310 million,
while taxing capital gains at death ("constructive realization") would increase
tax revenue by $75 million; on balance capital gains tax revenue would
increase. Since the New York Stock Exchange did not consider constructive
realization, a comparison of its estimates with the Treasury's estimates
should include only the effect of reducing gains tax rates. David, however,
apparently has confused the "on balance" effect of lower rates and construc-
tive realization with the effect of lower rates alone; he incorrectly states that
both the New York Stock Exchange and the Treasury have estimated that lower
gains tax rates would increase gains tax revenue. (Alternative Approaches ,
pp. 199-200, particularly note 3.) David mentions an expected $450 million
tax revenue increase due to increased asset turnover, but this is turnover
induced by constructive realization, according to correspondence from Thomas
Lee Smith (3 August 1966) and Thomas R. Lusk (July 1966), Office of Tax
Analysis, Office of the Secretary of the Treasury. This correspondence cited
Exhibit 46-A, particularly items 1 and 5 , in TAX TABLES AND CHARTS , PRINT
NO. 8 (as of September 9, 1963), prepared by the Treasury Department and
the Staff, Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, for use of THE
COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS in its EXECUTIVE CONSIDERATION OF THE
PRESIDENT'S 1963 TAX MESSAGE, pp. 209-211.
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and revenues" ); the Treasury's estimate is expected revenue "per year. "
Other empirical studies of the effect of capital gains taxation upon
securities markets do not bear upon the revenue effect of changing the long-
2
term tax rate, despite statements implying the contrary. Rather they
present evidence dealing with the postponement incentive created by the
3
differential between short and long-term capital gains tax rates.
New York Stock Exchange (1965, p. 6; also see mimeographed 1960,
p. 5; and printed 1960, pp. 2,6.) According to the Exchange's interviews,
lower long-term capital gains tax rates would cause the most dramatic
increases in expected realizations for securities in a selected list (the
same in 1965 as in 1960) of "twelve . . . widely-held . . . investment-
grade quality stocks" representing "more than 20% of the market value of
stocks traded on the New York Stock Exchange" and whose "combined turn-
over ratio was well under half of that for all other New York Stock Exchange
issues. " (The quotations are from pp. 5-6 of the printed 1960 statement,
but they apparently apply to 1964-1965 as well. See mimeographed 1965,
pp. 3-4, 8; mimeographed I960, pp. 2, 6.) Data on these twelve securities
may overestimate the effect of a gains tax cut on transactions volume in
other securities more frequently traded even at present "high" gains tax
rates. In 1965, each investor was asked about all securities in his port-
folio (mimeographed 1965, pp. 7,8), which was an improvement over the
1960 methodology. In 1960,investors holding any of the twelve issues were
asked only about those issues; data on other securities were obtained only
from investors holding none of the twelve issues (mimeographed 1960, pp.
1,3). In 1960 "data from the two groups of stocks [the twelve issues, and
other securities] could not be combined into a projection for the market as
a whole." (mimeographed I960, p. 3).
2
See the references listed in note 1 , page 38.
3
Independently of his postponement incentive data, Hinricks opines
that, aside from the opportunity to escape gains taxes at death ("the ultimate
ploy in tax avoidance"), the lock-in due to the long-term capital gains tax
rate is "not much. " Hinrichs , "An Empirical Measure, " p. 229.
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SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Tax equity requires a reasonable relative distribution of tax burdens
,
not arbitrary adherence to some artificial definition of "income. " If total
income including consumption and saving measures the citizenry's relative
taxpaying ability, then taxable income should include all realized capital
gains — whether spent on consumption or saved by remaining invested , and
even if "unreal" or "illusory" due to inflation or interest rate changes.
Those who realize capital gains of any kind are better off than those who
receive no gains or who realize losses. Because gains and losses are not
received in proportion to income but are distributed capriciously among
taxpayers with equal incomes and are most important for taxpayers with the
largest incomes, special treatment is an enormous disruption of the
horizontal and vertical equity of an income tax designed to assign relative
tax burdens fairly. To argue persuasively that special treatment is
equitable is very difficult.
In evaluating the resource allocation effects of capital gains tax
policy, special treatment's disadvantages and heavier capital gains
taxation's advantages must be compared with heavier gains taxation's
disadvantages.
Perhaps most harmful to the economy's overall efficiency and to the
quality of its real investment allocations is the real economic burden of
the overwhelming tax law complexity which special treatment of capital
gains and losses has introduced into federal income tax law. Since capital
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gains and losses are not readily distinguished from ordinary gains and
losses, special treatment inevitably creates legal chaos -- expensive for
taxpayer, government, and the economy as a whole.
Tax law complexity is not the only disadvantage of special treatment.
Limited capital loss deductibility discourages high risk investments.
Favorable tax treatment of capital gains distorts after-tax rates of return on
alternative financial and real investments, subsidizing investment projects
in industries able to arrange returns in the form of capital gains , and
penalizing movements of funds between firms as ordinary dividend income.
It thus encourages funds to move to new investments within rather than
between firms, and stimulates uneconomic diversifications, mergers, and
industrial concentration. Even with regard to securities markets, heavier
gains taxation could reduce or even eliminate some interferences with
capital mobility now caused by taxing gains at lower rates than ordinary
income. Exempting from tax all gains on assets held until death certainly
involves a postponement type of lock-in effect; so does taxing long-term
gains at lower rates than short-term gains.
The argument that heavier capital gains taxation would impair the
quality of real investment in new physical capital by hampering transactions
on financial markets, distorting relative security prices, magnifying security
prices' fluctuations, and thereby disrupting money flows, is fairly persua-
sive. However, the consequences of the lock-in effect for the behavior of
security prices have never been analyzed at all adequately. And empirical
evidence on the magnitude of this lock-in effect is scarce, poorly documented,
53
contradictory, and consequently inconclusive. The question here is: What
are the effects of capital gains taxation upon securities markets , and what
are their magnitudes? Valid answers to part two of this question, empirical
estimation, must wait upon conceptual understanding of the answer to part
one.
That Congress would be willing to tax capital gains as ordinary income
in one fell swoop is not likely. But a number of more modest steps could
reduce the differential between ordinary income and capital gains tax
treatment. Special favorable tax treatment of capital gains can be attacked
from two directions: raising the effective capital gains tax rates, and
reducing the types of receipts qualifying for capital gain treatment. These
changes, particularly if advocated strongly by the Administration, could
receive serious Congressional consideration.
Raising Effective Capital Gains Tax Rates
To vastly improve the equity of the income tax structure and to minimize
capital gains taxation's lock-in effect, the highest priority capital gains tax
reform should be to tax capital gains at death. Similarly, gifts of appreciated
assets should be subject to capital gains tax by the donor. (Under present
law, the recipient of a gift, if he sells it, measures his gain from the donor's
original cost or "basis. " Therefore, gift of an asset does not completely
avoid gains tax, but the gains tax may be reduced if the recipient is in a
lower tax bracket. A loss is measured from the donor's original cost, or
else from the gift's market value on the date of the gift, whichever is lower.)
For the income tax law changes necessary to tax capital gains as
ordinary income, see Folsom, Full Inclusion . Chapter IV; David, Alternative
Approaches , pp. 12-18, 33-35.
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The appraisals required for constructive realization of unrealized
capital gains and losses transferred by bequest or gift, unlike appraisals
for estate and inheritance taxes, would tend to be somewhat "self-
correcting" because they would furnish the heirs' cost bases. Excessive
appraisals would reduce heirs' later gains tax liabilities, and vice versa.
For the benefit of illiquid estates, gains taxes levied on any estate could
be payable in installments over a substantial number of years. If the
combined capital gains and other death tax liabilities would be too large,
the proper remedy is to reduce or eliminate the other death levies rather
than to continue the inequities and economic distortions due to complete
exemption from income tax of accrued gains held until death. Of course,
gains are not inevitable. An estate's net loss could be allocated to each
heir in proportion to his share of the total estate, either increasing the
cost basis of his inherited assets (other than cash) or providing him an
2
ordinary income tax deduction.
Repeal of the ordinary income tax deduction for nonbusiness interest
payments would further diminish the lock-in effect, since the interest
deduction encourages taxpayers to borrow on appreciated assets and to
3
hold them until death, or until the asset is given away.
The six months short term holding period could be lengthened to one
1
See Harriss, "Economic Effects of Estate and Gift Taxation" (1955),
pp. 860-862.
2
For a discussion of taxing accrued capital gains at death, see
David , Alternative Approaches , pp. 145-164, 213-214, 220-223.
For a discussion, see Simons, Federal Tax Reform (1950), pp. 61-68.
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year or even longer, although doing so might increase the short run lock-in
effect upon securities markets. The 25 percent maximum long-term capital
gains tax rate could be abolished, so that all taxpayers simply included half
of their net long-term gain in ordinary income. If this were done, losses
could be made more deductible, by treating them symmetrically with gains —
allowing taxpayers to deduct 5 percent of a year's net capital loss from
ordinary income. Eventually, this taxable long-term gain and deductible
loss proportion could be raised, to 60 percent or even higher, particularly
if such high rates were accompanied by averaging the taxed gain and
deductible loss on assets held more than one year.
Narrowing the Applicability of Capital Gain Treatment
Some steps to simplify the tax law by reducing the types of receipts
qualifying as capital gains would be to repeal capital gains treatment for
stock options, lump-sum withdrawals from pension plans, coal and timber
royalties, and gains on land and depreciable property used in a trade or
business. A more significant step would be to abolish completely the
distinction between capital gain and loss and ordinary income and loss
Recent Canadian tax proposals have included converting the corporate
income tax into a personal income tax "withholding" levy, taxing each
stockholder not only on the dividends he receives but also on his share of
the corporation's retained earnings, and taxing realized capital gains as
ordinary income. However, each taxpayer would reduce his gain (or increase
his loss) by his (already taxed) share of the corporation's retained earnings;
thus only "goodwill" realized capital gains over and above the capital gains
due to earnings retention would be taxed when selling a security. See Break,
"Integration of the Corporate and Personal Income Taxes" (1969).
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for corporations.
The most controversial narrowing of capital gain treatment would be
to fully tax all gains on residences and other real estate as ordinary income,
making all capital losses on real estate fully deductible. (Under present
law, a loss on one's residence does not even qualify as a capital loss. It
is not deductible against anything, on the grounds that it is a personal
living expense. Yet loss on a residence may stem from neighborhood
deterioration, population outflow, or an excessive building boom — none
of which are personal living expense or avoidable by the individual.) Gains
and losses on assets held more than one year should be averaged. Fully
taxing real estate gains as ordinary income should affect financial markets,
financial capital movements, and incentives to supply venture capital to
2
risky new growth businesses, only minimally.
Significantly heavier effective tax rates on capital gains, together
with improved deductibility for capital losses, would improve the equity of
the tax structure dramatically. Reducing the types of receipts qualifying
as capital gains would simplify the tax structure drastically. Whether
Despite his vigorous opposition to heavier capital gains taxation
under the personal income tax, this recommendation for corporate income
tax simplification is by Dan Throop Smith. He adds the proviso that the
highest corporate income tax rate be reduced below 5 percent. ( Smith,
pp. 203-205.) Since Smith's 1961 recommendation, the Revenue Act of
1964 reduced this rate from 52 to 48 percent, and the 10 percent surtax
has raised it to 52.8 percent.
2
This point is made by Richard A. Musgrave , "Effects of Tax Policy
on Private Capital Formation" (1963), pp. 105-106.
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heavier capital gains taxation on balance would improve or impair the
mobility of financial capital and the allocation of real investment is really
indeterminate. But at least the costs of special treatment are too serious
to ignore. "It is time for Congress to quit this ludicrous business of
dipping deeply into great incomes with a sieve. "
Henry Simons, Personal Income Taxation (1938), p. 219.
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